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This article studies the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to
undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. Thus, a regulatory non-
commitment setting in which the regulator sets the access price after the deployment of the
NGA network is used. In particular, it is assumed that the regulator sets the access price at
the marginal cost of providing the access with some probability and gives an access markup,
which equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. It is
found that when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep
in relation to the impact of investments on demand, the incumbent underinvests compared
to the socially optimal investment level. On the contrary, in a more realistic case when the
impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal investment
cost function, the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending on the probability of
incorporating an access markup into the access price.
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The migration from the legacy copper access networks to fiber access networks capable of providing high-speed
broadband services (hereafter referred to as Next Generation Access (NGA) networks1 ) has induced a growing interest in
the relationship between access regulation and investment incentives.2 The related literature concludes that the regulators’
two-fold goal to foster competition and encourage efficient and timely investments in NGA networks is related to the
common trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency.
In particular, mandated access at cost-based prices reduces the use of monopoly power over the access infrastructure by
preventing the incumbent from foreclosing the entrants from the downstream (retail) market. Cost-based access regulation
thus leads to sustainable service-based competition within one network, and hence, improves static efficiency (Bouckaert,
van Dijk, & Verboven, 2010; Valletti, 2003). However, mandating the access at cost-based prices discourages both
incumbents and potential entrants to invest in new access infrastructures (Jorde, Sidak, & Teece, 2000). According to
Cave and Prosperetti (2001), the reason for this negative relationship between access regulation and incumbents’ incentives
to invest is that the incumbents anticipate that they will be required to offer access to their rivals at cost-based prices.
Therefore, potential entrants, who can free-ride on the incumbent’s network, will wait for the incumbent to invest in newAll rights reserved.
.:+30 210 7275214.
nis), D.Varoutas@di.uoa.gr, dvaroutas@gmail.com (D. Varoutas).
orks means wired access networks which consist wholly or in part of optical elements and which are
h enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those provided over already
he result of an upgrade of an already existing copper or coaxial access network.
nd comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between
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limited to promote service-based competition, leads to losses in dynamic efficiency (Bouckaert et al., 2010).
For this reason, the ongoing research on this area is gradually shifting its focus from assessing the efficiency implications
of cost-oriented access schemes to proposing new regulatory approaches that may promote both static and dynamic
efficiency. This implies that access regulation of NGA services is still considered necessary for inducing socially optimal
investments. In this context, a first set of papers studies the impact of an investment-contingent access price on investment
incentives and competition. Henriques (2011) and Sauer (2011) show that contrary to a fixed access charge, an access fee
that is contingent on firms’ (non-overlapping) investments can implement the socially efficient investment level. This
outcome holds either if the access charge depends on the investments of both the incumbent and the entrant (former
article) or on each operator’s own investment level (latter article).
Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011) introduce uncertainty about the success of NGA investments and focus on an incumbent’s
investment incentives in order to study the efficiency outcomes of different regulatory regimes. They show that under an
access price that spreads investment costs over total output quantities (i.e. an investment-contingent access scheme), a
regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induce highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and
forward-looking cost-based regulation. In addition, combining strong competitive intensity with reasonable investment
incentives indicates that a risk sharing approach induces highest consumer surplus, followed by regimes with fully
distributed costs, regulatory holiday and forward-looking cost-based regulation. Bender (2011) extends the work of Nitsche
and Wiethaus by introducing horizontal product differentiation and assuming that the entrant may not share the
investment costs with the incumbent but bears a fixed part of the investment costs (i.e. a cooperation regime). The author
finds that there is no single regime which always yields highest investments as full distribution, as well as, cooperation
might maximize the investment incentives, whereas the optimal regulatory policy is mainly subject to the degree of product
differentiation.
It is important to note that the abovementioned articles, which are based on an investment-contingent access price,
assume that the regulator can make ex ante credible commitments. This implies that the regulator sets the access price prior
to the investments, and hence, the firms invest under regulatory certainty. Although this modeling setup is consistent with
the European Commission (EC) Recommendation on regulated access to NGA (EU Commission, 2010), it is socially not
optimal for the regulator to make ex ante commitments for an unreasonably long regulatory period (WIK, 2009). Therefore,
in providing greater regulatory certainty the regulator has to make another trade-off between the positive effects of greater
certainty on investment incentives and possible negative effects of erroneous intervention on welfare (OPTA, 2010).
As a result, a second set of papers studies the impact of access regulation on investment incentives under regulatory non-
commitment. In this case, it is assumed that the regulator cannot make ex ante credible commitments, and hence, the firms
invest prior to the regulation of the access. Foros (2004) studies the impact of cost-based access regulation on an
incumbent’s incentives to invest in network upgrade in the presence of spillover effects. It is found that when the incumbent
is much more efficient in providing value-added services than the entrant, then the incumbent can foreclose the entrant
from the market by overinvesting in quality. In addition, Kotakorpi (2006) points out that, under cost-based regulation, the
incumbent underinvests in relation to the socially optimal level. Mizuno and Yoshino (2012) allow an enlarged range of
spillovers in order to examine the impact of regulatory non-commitment on the properties of a welfare maximizing access
charge. They find that when the degree of spillover is small and the incumbent’s investment cost is high (respectively, low),
the incumbent has an incentive to utilize regulatory non-commitment to induce a high (respectively, low) access charge by
overinvesting (respectively, underinvesting) in infrastructure.
Contrary to the three previous articles that use a fixed access charge, Klumpp and Su (2010) assume an investment-
contingent access price which is revenue-neutral. This implies that each downstream firm contributes to the depreciation of
the investment costs according to its market share. They show that, under this rule, the incumbent chooses a higher
investment level compared to that of a monopolist and its investment incentives increases with the number of downstream
competitors. Thus, they argue that a policy of revenue-neutral open access can increase both static and dynamic efficiency.
Sarmento and Brandao (2007) compare the investment and competition outcomes of an access price which equals the
marginal cost of providing the access plus the average cost of the investments with those derived by the retail-minus
regulation and the deregulation of the access price. They conclude that retail-minus regulation leads to better results than
cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and consumer surplus as long as the regulator carefully defines the retail-
minus instrument.
Last, Cambini and Silvestri (2012) also study the impact of regulatory non-commitment on the incumbent’s investment
incentives, but their research focuses on the timing of the investments rather than on the extent of NGA deployment. For
this reason, they use a dynamic setting with demand uncertainty in order to compare the efficiency outcomes of three
different regulatory regimes: full regulation (the NGA network is regulated), partial regulation (the NGA network is
unregulated) and risk sharing (fixed investment costs are shared but there are no side payments between firms for the use
of the NGA). They conclude that the investment is always undertaken later than in the social optimum in all regulatory
regimes.
It can be thus concluded that the related literature provides useful results concerning the effectiveness of particular
access pricing schemes and certain regulatory regimes on promoting both static and dynamic efficiency. However, the
articles that examine the relationship between access regulation and investment incentives under regulatory non-
commitment take the regulator’s decision as given. As a result, they fail to take into account the fact that there is
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Kotakorpi, 2006; Mizuno & Yoshino, 2012) assume that the firms anticipate that the regulator will set the welfare
maximizing access price, whereas others (Klumpp & Su, 2010; Sarmento & Brandao, 2007) assume that the investment-
contingent access price is ex ante known. Therefore, the difference in the results of the commitment and the non-
commitment models is mainly driven by the sequential timing of the games rather than by the regulatory uncertainty of the
non-commitment games.
On the contrary, this paper takes into account the regulator’s incentives to deviate from an investment-contingent access
pricing rule (which implies that the regulator compensates the incumbent for the investment risks) by setting the social
welfare maximizing access price once the investments are in place. In particular, it is assumed that the regulator may
implement the access rule proposed by Sarmento and Brandao (2007) or set the welfare maximizing access price. This
implies that when the incumbent invests prior to the regulation of the access, there is an uncertainty about the level of the
access charge. The aim of this paper is to model such regulatory uncertainty and to study its impact on an incumbent’s
investment incentives and on the subsequent welfare outcomes.
It is found that when the probability of compensating the incumbent for the investment risks increases, the incumbent’s
investment incentives increase and the socially optimal investment level decreases. In addition, the critical value of such
probability that makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal (efficient) investments is decreasing in the slope of the
marginal investment cost function and increasing in the effect of the investments on demand. Thus, when the slope of the
marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep in relation to the positive impact of investments on demand, the
incumbent always underinvests compared to the socially optimal investments. On the contrary, in a more realistic case,
when the impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal investment cost function, the
incumbent overinvests for high probability of setting the access pricing rule of Sarmento and Brandao (2007) and
underinvests for low probability values.
It is thus obvious that the effectiveness of access price regulation on promoting both static and dynamic efficiency (i.e.
inducing the socially optimal investments in NGA networks) does not only depend on the underlying demand and cost
structure (as the related literature concludes), but is also dependent on the expected probability of a regulatory deviation
from a particular investment-contingent access pricing rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of the basic assumptions and definitions of the
model. Section 3 provides the equilibrium of the game when the regulatory uncertainty is taken into account. Section 4
compares the privately and the socially optimal investment levels derived in Section 3 in order to draw regulatory
implications. The last section summarizes the key findings of this article.
2. The model
This section presents a simple model used in order to assess the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s
incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in new access infrastructures. In particular, the model used in this
paper is quite similar to that of Sarmento and Brandao (2007) in terms of demand and cost structure, as well as, the timing
of the game.
2.1. Demand side
The retail (downstream) market is characterized as an unregulated duopoly market in which the incumbent (the
subsidiary firm of the upstream monopolist) and the entrant (the independent firm) choose quantities simultaneously and
independently (i.e. firms compete á la Cournot). It is further assumed that since the prospective investors in NGA networks
are for large part the former incumbent operators (OPTA, 2010), the incumbent decides its optimal NGA investment level
first and then the entrant seeks access to the incumbent’s NGA network.3
The inverse demand function is given by p¼ 1þ βI−ðq1 þ q2Þ, where p is the retail market price, q1 and q2 are the
quantities supplied by the incumbent and the entrant respectively, I represents the level of the NGA investments
undertaken by the incumbent, and β represents the impact of a marginal change in the investment level on the retail
price (ceteris paribus). It is also assumed that β40, which implies that an increase in the NGA investment level leads to an
outward parallel shift in the demand that benefits both retailers.
2.2. Supply side
The NGA deployment is continuous where a larger I reflects a fiber deployment closer to the consumers’ premises. The
incumbent faces a quadratic NGA investment cost function with respect to I, given by CðIÞ ¼ φI2=2, with φ40. The cost3 This assumption reflects the EU Commission’s argument that in most cases NGAs are the result of an upgrade of an already existing copper access
network. The reason is that the former incumbent operators usually upgrade their access networks by replacing part of the copper networks with optical
elements (i.e. FTTC variants). On the contrary, a narrower definition of NGA networks (i.e. FTTH/B) may reflect the fact that alternative operators seem to
dominate such network deployment. However, the results of this paper do not change qualitatively if we assume that the entrant decides its optimal NGA
investment level first and then the incumbent seeks access to the entrant’s NGA network.
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costs increase as well (for a given investment level). For this reason, the term “investment cost parameter” refers to φ,
whereas the term “investment costs” refers to the total costs of NGA investments denoted by CðIÞ. The convex form of the
NGA investment cost function reflects the fact that fiber deployment becomes marginally more expensive as it is being laid
down towards consumers’ premises. It is further assumed that the NGA investment level does not have any impact on the
(fixed) marginal cost of providing the access denoted by c, (co1). In addition, the production of one unit of the retail service
requires one unit of the upstream input (fixed coefficients technology).
The access price that the entrant should pay to the incumbent in order to have access to the incumbent’s NGA network is
denoted by w, assuming w≥c. The regulator defines the access price as the marginal cost of providing the access (c) plus a
fraction k of the total investment costs, that is w¼ cþ kCðIÞ, with ko1. If k¼ 0, the regulator sets the access price at the
marginal cost of providing the access, whereas if k∈ð0;1Þ, the regulator (partially or fully) compensates the investor for the
uncertainty of NGA investments.
Last, the quality of the input sold by the monopolist is the same whether it is sold to the incumbent or to the entrant. In
addition, the cost of all other inputs is equal for both retailers and normalized to zero.
2.3. Timing of the game
This paper falls into the literature which assumes that the regulator cannot make ex ante credible commitments on its
future interventions, and hence, the incumbents decide their optimal investment level prior to the regulation of the access.
Therefore, the timing of the game is as follows:maFirstly, the incumbent decides the investment level I that maximizes its profits.
 Secondly, the regulator chooses an access price w that may incorporate a risk premium reflecting the uncertainty of NGA
investments, i.e. k∈½0;1Þ.
 Finally, the retail price and outputs of the firms are defined by Cournot competition between downstream firms.
According to Sarmento and Brandao (2007), the regulator sets the access price equal to the marginal cost of providing the
access plus the average cost of the investments. Therefore, k¼ ð1=IÞ and w¼ cþ ðφI=2Þ. This definition of the access price
implies that the average cost of the investments can be seen as an access markup that fully compensates the investor for the
uncertainty of NGA investments. However, Cave and Prosperetti (2001), as well as, Foros (2004) argue that the regulator is
expected to set the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access (i.e. k¼ 0) in order to maximize social welfare as
soon as the incumbent invests in NGA network.4 In this paper, it is assumed that the incumbent anticipates that k¼ ð1=IÞ
with probability α and k¼ 0 with probability ð1−αÞ, where α∈½0;1.5 In the former case, the regulator fully compensates
(“FC”) the incumbent for the investment risks; and in the latter case, the regulator sets the social welfare maximizing access
price, which implies that the regulator does not compensate (“NC”) the incumbent for the uncertainty of NGA investments.
The profit functions of the incumbent (firm 1) and the entrant (firm 2) are given, respectively, by:
π1 ¼ ðp−cÞq1 þ ðw−cÞq2−φI2=2 ð1Þ
π2 ¼ ðp−wÞq2 ð2Þ
Therefore, when w¼ cþ ðφI=2Þ, the two firms make the following profits (gross of investment costs):
πFC1 ¼ ½ðPFC−cÞqFC1 þ ðφI=2ÞqFC2 α ð3Þ
πFC2 ¼ ½ðPFC−c−φI=2ÞqFC2 α ð4Þ
whereas, when w¼ c the respective profit functions are (gross of investment costs):
πNC1 ¼ ½ðpNC−cÞqNC1 ð1−αÞ ð5Þ
πNC2 ¼ ½ðpNC−cÞqNC2 ð1−αÞ ð6Þ
It is obvious that total profits of the incumbent and the entrant are given, respectively, by:
π1 ¼ πFC1 þ πNC1 −φI2=2 ð7Þ
π2 ¼ πFC2 þ πNC2 ð8Þ4 Indeed, it is shown in Appendix A1 that social welfare is maximized for ko0. However since it is generally assumed that w≥c, the access price that
ximizes social welfare is w¼ c.
5 This is the typical way that the related literature handles the imperfect commitment to access price. For a particular example, see Vareda (2010).
M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas / Telecommunications Policy 37 (2013) 879–892 8833. Equilibrium of the game
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the incumbent’s incentives to invest in NGA
networks and to draw regulatory implications from the comparison between the NGA investment level chosen by the
incumbent (i.e. the privately optimal level) and the respective level of NGA investments that maximizes social welfare (i.e.
the socially optimal level).
The backward induction technique is used to find the equilibrium of the whole game. Therefore, the analysis begins with
the computation of the retail price and the output of the firms as a function of the investment level and the access price.
Then, the regulator chooses an access price w that may incorporate a risk premium reflecting the uncertainty of NGA
investments. In particular, the access price is w¼ cþ ðφI=2Þ with probability α or w¼ c with probability ð1−αÞ. Hence, the
profits functions of both retailers are derived as a function of the investment level and the probability α. Taking into account
the derived results, the privately and socially optimal investment levels are obtained as a function of α.
3.1. Retail competition
Substituting p¼ 1þ βI−ðq1 þ q2Þ in Eqs. (1) and (2), and taking the first order condition with respect to q1 and q2,
respectively, gives the reaction function of each firm to the quantity supplied by the other. Solving simultaneously the
reaction functions for both operators yields the output of the firms and the subsequent retail price:
q1 ¼ ð1þ βI þw−2cÞ=3 ð9Þ
q2 ¼ ð1þ βI−2wþ cÞ=3 ð10Þ
p¼ ð1þ βI þwþ cÞ=3 ð11Þ
3.2. Access price regulation
In this stage the regulator sets the price that the entrant should pay to the incumbent in order to have access to the NGA
network. In particular, the regulator may compensate the incumbent for the NGA investment risks or set the access price
equal to the marginal cost of providing the access in order to maximize social welfare. Substituting w¼ cþ ðφI=2Þ in
Eqs. (9)–(11) gives the output of the firms and the subsequent retail price when the access price includes a markup equal to
the average cost of the investments. Hence:
qFC1 ¼ ð1þ βI−cþ φI=2Þ=3 ð12Þ
qFC2 ¼ ð1þ βI−c−φIÞ=3 ð13Þ
pFC ¼ ð1þ βI þ 2cþ φI=2Þ=3 ð14Þ
On the contrary, when the regulator does not compensate the incumbent for the investment risks, the output of the firms
and the subsequent retail price are derived by substituting w¼ c in Eqs. (9)–(11). Hence:
qNC1 ¼ ð1þ βI−cÞ=3 ð15Þ
qNC2 ¼ ð1þ βI−cÞ=3 ð16Þ
pNC ¼ ð1þ βI þ 2cÞ=3 ð17Þ
Given that the total output in the compensation case is given by QFC ¼ ðqFC1 þ qFC2 Þ and in the non-compensation case by
QNC ¼ ðqNC1 þ qNC2 Þ, the levels of total output (Q), consumer surplus (CS), each provider’s profits, and social welfare (SW) are
as follows:
Q ¼ αQFC þ ð1−αÞQNC ¼ ð2þ 2βI−2c−αφI=2Þ=3 ð18Þ
CS¼ ½αðQFCÞ2 þ ð1−αÞðQNCÞ2=2⇒
CS¼ ½ð1−cÞð16−16cþ 32βI−8αφIÞ þ I2ð16β2−8αβφþ αφ2Þ=72 ð19Þ
π1 ¼ ½ð1−cÞð4−4cþ 8βI þ 10αφIÞ þ 2φI2ð5αβ−9Þ þ I2ð4β2−5αφ2Þ=36 ð20Þ
π2 ¼ ½ð1−cÞð1−cþ 2βI−2αφIÞ þ I2ðαφ2−2αβφþ β2=9 ð21Þ
SW ¼ π1 þ π2 þ CS⇒
SW ¼ ½ð1−cÞð32−32cþ 64βI−4αφIÞ þ I2ð32β2−4αβφ−36φ−αφ2Þ=72 ð22Þ
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Taking the first order condition of Eq. (20) with respect to I, gives the NGA investment level that maximizes the
incumbent’s (private) profits:
In ¼ ð1−cÞð4β þ 5αφÞ=ð18φþ 5αφ2−4β2−10αβφÞ ð23Þ
It is obvious that, as long as X≡18φþ 5αφ2−4β2−10αβφ40, the incumbent’s profit is a concave function of I, and hence,
there exists a unique equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses a positive NGA investment level. In addition, taking the
first derivative of Eq. (23) with respect to α yields:
∂In=∂α¼ 10φð1−cÞð9φþ 2β2−2βφÞ=ðX2Þ40 ð24Þ
From Eq. (24) it can be deduced that as α increases, the incumbent chooses a higher NGA investment level. In other
words, a higher certainty about the compensation of the incumbent leads to a higher NGA deployment. In addition, the level
of social welfare that corresponds to the privately optimal investments is derived by substituting In into Eq. (22). Therefore:
SWn ¼ φð1−cÞ2ð100α3βφ2−125α3φ3 þ 880α2β2φ−1720α2βφ2 þ 800α2φ3
−1260α2φ2−16αβ2φ−7488αβφþ 5760αφ2−576β2 þ 10368φÞ=ð72X2Þ ð25Þ
Although this section pointed out the significance of the regulatory uncertainty on the incumbent’s incentives to invest
in NGA networks, a more elaborate analysis is needed in order to examine such relationship from a social perspective.3.4. Socially optimal investments
The socially optimal investment level is derived by taking the first order condition of Eq. (22) with respect to I. Hence, the
NGA investment level that maximizes social welfare is given by:
Inn ¼ ð1−cÞð32β−2αφÞ=ð36φþ αφ2 þ 4αβφ−32β2Þ ð26Þ
Eq. (26) states that the NGA investment level that maximizes social welfare is positive as long as: (i) the investment cost
parameter, φ, is not extremely high in relation to the impact of investments on demand (i.e. φo16β=α); and (ii) social
welfare is a concave function of I (i.e. Y≡36φþ αφ2 þ 4αβφ−32β240). A necessary and sufficient condition which ensures
that X and Y are both positive is φ4φL, where φL ¼ ð2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α2β2 þ 8αβ2 þ 18αβ þ 81
q
−2αβ−18Þ=α.6
Remark 1. Assuming that the investment cost parameter is higher than the critical value φL ensures that the privately and the
socially optimal investment levels are both positive as long as the investment cost parameter is not extremely high in relation to
the impact of investments on demand.
Remark 1 implies that the higher the impact of the investments on demand, the higher the investment cost parameter
should be in order to ensure that the incumbent will choose a positive NGA investment level that maximizes either its
profits or social welfare. Therefore, given that the investment cost parameter is not extremely high in relation to the impact
of investments on demand (i.e. φo16β=α), the assumption φ4φL ensures that X;Y40.
Furthermore, taking the first derivative of Eq. (26) with respect to α yields:
∂Inn=∂α¼ 8φðc−1Þð9φþ 8β2 þ 4βφÞ=ðY2Þo0 ð27Þ
From Eq. (27) it can be deduced that there is a negative relationship between α and Inn since co1. This implies that the
socially optimal investment level increases with an increase in the probability of setting the access price equal to the
marginal cost of providing the access. Therefore, a marginal increase in α positively affects the private investment incentives
and negatively affects the socially optimal investments. This is an expected result since the incumbent’s profits increase with
an increase in the access price, whereas social welfare increases with a decrease in the access price.
However, for any given value of α, the level of social welfare that corresponds to the socially optimal investments reflects
the maximum social welfare outcome. This level is derived by substituting Inn into Eq. (22):
SWnn ¼ φð1−cÞ2ð288þ 8αφþ α2φÞ=ð18YÞ ð28Þ
Since the aim of this paper is to study the impact of the regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to
undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks, the next section derives the value of α that results in the same
privately and socially optimal investment level.6 The proof is given in Appendix A2.
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This section assesses the value of α that makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA
networks. The comparison of In and Inn shows that:
Inn−In ¼ 3Zφð1−cÞ=ðXYÞ ð29Þ
where
Z ¼ 144β þ 52αβφ−72αφ−5α2φ2−56αβ2 ð30Þ
Given that X;Y40 and co1, it can be concluded that when Z ¼ 0, the incumbent undertakes the socially optimal
investments in NGA networks, whereas when Z40 (respectively, Zo0) the incumbent underinvests (respectively,
overinvests) compared to the socially optimal investment level.
In addition, the comparison of SWn and SWnn shows that:
SWnn−SWn ¼ ½Zφð1−cÞ2=ð72X2YÞ ð31Þ
From Eq. (31) it can be inferred that the society is always better off when the incumbent undertakes the socially optimal
investment level rather than the respective level that maximizes its profits, with the exception of Z ¼ 0. In the latter case, the
incumbent undertakes the socially optimal investments, and hence, the derived social welfare level reaches the maximum
welfare outcome. It can be thus deduced that the incumbent’s choice to deviate from the socially optimal investment level
results in welfare losses which reflects the standard trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency.
Solving Eq. (30) with respect to α derives the value of the probability of including a markup into the access price that
tackles this efficiency trade-off. In other words, the value of α which leads to Inn ¼ In and SWnn ¼ SWn (or equivalently to
Z ¼ 0) is given by:
~α ¼
26βφ−36φ−28β27
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
196β4−364β3φþ 169β2φ2 þ 504β2φ−288βφ2 þ 324φ2
q
2
4
3
5=ð5φ2Þ ð32Þ
Let ~α denotes the positive value of α that induces the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal investments.7
Therefore:
~α ¼
26βφ−36φ−28β2þ
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
196β4−364β3φþ 169β2φ2 þ 504β2φ−288βφ2 þ 324φ2
q
2
4
3
5=ð5φ2Þ ð33Þ
It can be thus deduced that, when α4 ~α (respectively, αo ~α), the value of Z is negative (respectively, positive), and hence,
the NGA investment level chosen by the incumbent is higher (respectively, lower) than the socially optimal one. This implies
that any deviation from the socially optimal investments leads to welfare losses (i.e. SWnn4SWn for α≠ ~α). The derived value
of ~α is significantly affected by the impact of the investments on demand and the investment cost parameter. In particular,
the value of ~α is positively affected by an increase in β and negatively affected by an increase in φ (ceteris paribus).8 This
implies that, for a given investment cost parameter, higher consumers’ valuation for the NGA services results in higher ~α,
which in turn leads to higher efficient investment levels. In other words, higher values of β, make the investments more
socially desirable, and hence, the socially optimal investment level is achieved for a higher probability of compensating the
incumbent for the investment risks. This result positively affects the incumbent’s investment incentives, and hence, the
achieved efficient investment level increases as well.
On the contrary, for a given positive impact of the investments on demand, a steeper slope of the marginal investment
cost function leads to lower values of ~α. This implies that as the NGA investments become marginally more expensive, the
society is better off by a lower NGA deployment which is achieved by a higher probability of setting the access price at the
marginal cost of providing the access. Therefore, the efficient NGA investment level is achieved for lower values of ~α.
Fig. 1 graphically presents the results of the above analysis concerning the impact of β and φ on ~α. In particular, it
presents the results of the numerical simulations used in order to derive the values of ~α for different combinations of β and φ
given that φ4φLð ~αÞ.9
Fig. 1 graphically verifies the positive relationship between ~α and β, as well as, the negative relationship between ~α and φ.
In addition, it is obvious that there are some combinations of β and φ which leads to ~α41. This implies that for every value
of β there is at least one value of φ that makes ~α ¼ 1. Solving ~α ¼ 1 with respect to φ yields:
~φ ¼ ð26β−3676
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
11β2−32β þ 36
q
Þ=5 ð34Þ7 This result is numerically proven in Appendix B. In particular, the positive (respectively, negative) value of ~α is decreasing (respectively, increasing)
function of φ. However, there is always one positive and one negative value of ~α since they both tend to zero as φ tends to infinity.
8 The proof is given in Appendix A3.
9 Fig. 1 is a graphical representation of Tables B1–B3 of Appendix B.
Fig. 1. The relationship between ~α and φ.
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~α ¼ 1.10 Therefore:
~φ ¼ ð26β−36þ 6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
11β2−32β þ 36
q
Þ=5 ð35Þ
From Eq. (35) it can be deduced that as long as φo ~φ, the value of α that makes the incumbent undertake the socially
optimal investments is higher than 1. In other words, when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not
particularly steep in relation to the impact of NGA investments on consumers’ willingness to pay, then regulatory certainty
about the incorporation of an access markup into the access price (i.e. α¼ 1) is not adequate to achieve the efficient
investment outcome. This implies that the incumbent always underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment
level since α∈½0;1o ~α. In this case, a higher access markup which leads to ~α≤1 seems to be socially desirable. This implies
that the combination of a low investment cost parameter and a high impact of investments on demand makes the
investments more attractive from a social perspective. Thus, the optimal regulatory policy is to provide the incumbent with
significant investment incentives.
In addition, the critical value ~φ, which makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments when ~α ¼ 1,
increases with an increasing rate as β increases as well.11 This implies that as β increases, the investment cost parameter
should be significantly higher in order to ensure that ~α ¼ 1. If the investment cost parameter is higher than the critical value
of ~φ given by Eq. (35), then the value of α that makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments is lower
than 1. In other words, when the investment cost parameter is relatively high compared to the impact of the investments on
demand, the incumbent undertakes the socially optimal investments for a particular ~α∈ð0;1Þ. Therefore, the following
proposition can be stated:
Proposition 1. As long as the investment cost parameter is high in relation to the impact of the investments on demand, there is
a positive critical value of α, denoted by ~α∈ð0;1Þ, that induces the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal investments. When
αo ~α (respectively, α4 ~α), the incumbent underinvests (respectively, overinvests) compared to the socially optimal investments,
and hence, there are welfare losses.
From Proposition 1, it can be deduced that the uncertainty about future regulatory intervention significantly affects the
incumbent’s expectations, and hence, its decision to undertake the socially efficient investments. Moreover, when the value
of ~α is close to 0, the regulator has significant incentives to set the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access.
On the contrary, when the value of ~α is close to 1, an investment-contingent access price which includes a lower markup
than the average cost of the investments and leads to ~α ¼ 1 seems to be socially desirable.
As it has been already stated above, the derived value of ~α is significantly affected by the particular value of the
parameters β and φ. Fig. 2 presents a representative example of the cases in which the difference between β and φ is
relatively high (i.e. results in ~αo1) since they illustrate the relationship between In and Inn, as well as, SWn and SWnn when
β¼ 1 and φ¼ 6 (i.e. results in ~α ¼ 0:530).
Fig. 2 numerically verifies the results of Eqs. (24) and (27) which state than an increase in α positively affects the privately
investment incentives and negatively affects the socially optimal investments. In addition, it shows that the privately and
the socially optimal NGA investment levels coincide for ~α ¼ 0:530o1. This is due to the fact that the investment cost
parameter is high in relation to the impact of the investments on demand since φ¼ 64 ~φ ¼ 2:648. Therefore, when α¼ ~α,
Eq. (30) yields Z ¼ 0, and hence, Inn ¼ In. On the contrary, when αo ~α (respectively, α4 ~α), the incumbent underinvests10 Table B5 (see Appendix B) provides the values of ~φ for different values of β. The discussion following Table B5 proves that: (i) the value of ~φ given by
Eq. (35) is the highest one; and (ii) the rejected value of ~φ does not affect the final outcomes.
11 The proof is given in Appendix A4.
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Fig. 2. The privately and socially optimal investment levels as a function of α (β¼ 1, φ¼ 6, c¼ 0:5).
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Fig. 3. The subsequent social welfare levels as a function of α (β¼ 1, φ¼ 6, c¼ 0:5).
M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas / Telecommunications Policy 37 (2013) 879–892 887(respectively, overinvests) compared to the socially optimal investment level. The resulting social welfare levels are
presented in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3 shows that there is a unique positive value of α which leads the social welfare levels derived by the privately and
the socially optimal investment choices to coincide (i.e. SWnn ¼ SWn). In this numerical example, Eq. (31) holds for ~α ¼ 0:530
which implies that the value of α that makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments equals the
respective value of α that makes the social welfare levels derived by the privately and the socially optimal investment
choices coincide. Therefore, the incumbent not only undertakes the socially optimal investments, but also maximizes the
potential social welfare outcome since Inn ¼ In and SWnn ¼ SWn. In all other cases SWnn4SWn, which means that the optimal
social welfare outcome cannot be achieved with the incumbent’s profit maximizing investment level.5. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to study the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the
socially optimal investments in NGA networks. For this reason, a regulatory non-commitment setting in which the
incumbent invests prior to the regulation of the access was used. The related literature discusses the effectiveness of two
different regulatory approaches on the regulator’s goal to achieve the socially efficient investment level. The first approach
supports that the regulator sets a particular investment-contingent access price, which compensates the incumbent for the
investment risks, in order to provide significant investment incentives. On the contrary, the second approach argues that the
regulator deviates from such ex ante known access price (once the investments are in place) by setting the access price at the
marginal cost of providing the access (i.e. setting the social welfare maximizing access price).
The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is that it modeled the more realistic case in which the
regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access with some probability and gives an access
markup, which equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. Therefore, it is uncertain
which of the two assumptions made in the related literature will prevail when the new access infrastructures are in place.
It is found that when the investment cost parameter (φ) is not high (which implies that the slope of the marginal
investment cost function is not particularly steep) in relation to the impact of investments on demand (β), the incumbent
underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment level. The reason is that the critical value of the probability of
including an access markup into the access price ( ~α), which leads the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal
investments, is decreasing in φ and increasing in β. As a result, ~α41. This implies that the socially desirable outcome cannot
M. Tselekounis, D. Varoutas / Telecommunications Policy 37 (2013) 879–892888be achieved even if the regulator commits to an access price scheme that includes an access markup equal to the average
cost of the investments. In this case, a higher access markup which leads to ~α≤1 seems to be socially desirable.
On the contrary, when the investment cost parameter is high and the impact of investments on demand is relatively low,
the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending on the probability of incorporating the average cost of the
investments into the access price. In this case, ~αo1. In particular, when αo ~α (respectively, α4 ~α), the incumbent
underinvests (respectively, overinvests) compared to the socially optimal investment, and hence, there are welfare losses.
This implies that regulatory uncertainty significantly affects the incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal
investments in NGA networks.
However, it is acknowledged that significant future research is needed. For example, the derived results may change if we
take into account the fact that the migration from copper access networks to NGA networks is a slow process (Bourreau,
Cambini, & Hoernig, 2012). This implies that during the migration phase both the legacy copper access networks and the
NGA networks are in operation and are competing for customers. Therefore, the impact of the regulation of the legacy
copper networks on the uncertainty about the regulation of the NGA networks should be modeled in order to assess the
investment and competition outcomes.12Acknowledgments
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Appendix A.
A1. Proof that social welfare is maximized for ko0
Substituting Eqs. (9)–(11) into (1) and (2) gives the profit functions of the incumbent and the entrant, respectively, under
Cournot competition:
π1 ¼ ½2þ 2βIð2þ βI−7cþ 5wÞ þ 2c2−14cþ 10wð1þ c−wÞ þ 9φI2=18 ðA1Þ
π2 ¼ ð1þ βI−2wþ cÞ2=9 ðA2Þ
Consumer surplus is given by:
CS¼ ðq1 þ q2Þ2=2¼ ð2þ 2βI−c−wÞ2=18 ðA3Þ
whereas social welfare (SW) is the unweighted sum of industry profits and consumer surplus (i.e. SW ¼ π1 þ π2 þ CS):
SW ¼ ð8þ 8β2I2−14βcI−2βwI þ 16βI þ 5c2 þ 4cw−14c−w2−2wþ 9φI2Þ=18 ðA4Þ
Now assume that the regulator sets an access price equal to the marginal cost of providing the access (c) plus a fraction k
of the total investment costs, that is w¼ cþ kCðIÞ, with ko1. Substituting this access price in Eq. (A4) and taking the first
order condition with respect to k gives:
∂SW=∂k¼ 0⇒−φI2ð2þ 2βI−2cþ kφI2Þ=36¼ 0⇒
kn ¼−2ð1þ βI−cÞ=φI2 ðA5Þ
It is obvious that kno0 since co1. This implies that the optimal access price is lower than the marginal cost of providing
the access. Considering this optimal value of k, the access price is given by w¼ 2c−βI−1. Therefore, the retail price equals the
marginal cost of providing the access (p¼ c), the incumbent is not active in the market (q1 ¼ 0) and the entrant produces the
whole output (q2 ¼ 1þ βI−c). Since the incumbent’s profits are negative, which are offset by the positive profits of the
entrant, the optimal investment policy for the incumbent is to avoid any NGA deployment (i.e. I ¼ 0 given that I≥0).
However, it should be noted that since it is assumed that w≥c, the regulator maximizes social welfare by setting kn ¼ 0, or
equivalently, w¼ c.
A2. Proof that φ4φL is a necessary and sufficient condition to ensure that X,Y40.
Recall that X≡18φþ 5αφ2−4β2−10αβφ and Y≡36φþ αφ2 þ 4αβφ−32β2. Therefore, X ¼ Y when:
φ1 ¼ ð9þ 7αβ−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
49α2β2−112αβ2 þ 126αβ þ 81
q
Þ=ð4αÞ ðA6Þ12 See Bourreau, Cambini, and Dogan (2012), Brito, Pereira, and Vareda (2010, 2012) and Inderst and Peitz (2012) for the impact of the regulation of the
legacy network on the firms’ investment incentives when the NGA market is left unregulated or when there is an interplay between the access prices of the
two networks.
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φ2 ¼ ð9þ 7αβ þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
49α2β2−112αβ2 þ 126αβ þ 81
q
Þ=ð4αÞ ðA7Þ
In particular, Y4X when φ1oφoφ2 and X4Ywhen φoφ1 or φ4φ2. In the former case (Y4X), X and Y are both
positive if X40. This implies that φ should be higher than the positive root of X ¼ 0 with respect to φ which is given by:
φ3 ¼ ð5αβ−9þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
25α2β2 þ 20αβ2−90αβ þ 81
q
Þ=ð5αÞ ðA8Þ
However, note that the difference φ1−φ3 is always positive for β40. This implies that φ14φ3, and hence, φ4φ3 since
φ1oφoφ2. As a result X;Y40.
On the contrary, X4Y when φoφ1 or φ4φ2. In this case, X and Y are both positive if Y40. This implies that φ should be
higher than the positive root of Y ¼ 0 with respect to φ which is given by:
φ4 ¼ ð2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
α2β2 þ 8αβ2 þ 18αβ þ 81
q
−2αβ−18Þ=α ðA9Þ
It should be also noted that the difference φ1−φ4 is always positive for β40. This implies that φ4oφ1. Therefore, the
condition which ensures that Y40 is φ4φ4.
In conclusion, φ4φ4≡φL, which implies that the investment cost parameter is higher than a critical value of φ denoted by
φL, is a necessary and sufficient condition which ensures that X;Y40.
A3. The impact of β and φ on ~α.
Taking the first order condition of ~α with respect to β gives:
∂ ~α=∂β¼ 0⇒φβ ¼ ð13β2 þ 36β−β
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
169β2−576β þ 1296
q
Þ=27 ðA10Þ
Therefore, as long as φ4φβ , there is a positive relationship between ~α and β. Substituting φβ into ~α and then the derived
value of ~α into φL, gives the lower value of φ which ensures that X;Y40. It is proven that φβ ¼ φL, and hence ∂ ~α=∂β40 since
φ4φL. The numerical simulations presented in Appendix B1 and graphically illustrated in Fig. 1 verify the positive
relationship between ~α and β.
In addition, taking the first order derivative of ~α with respect to φ gives:
∂ ~α
∂φ
¼
18φ
ﬃﬃﬃ
ψ
p −288βφ2 þ 756β2φ−546β3φ−28β2 ﬃﬃﬃψp þ
394β4 þ 324φ2 þ 169β2φ2 þ 13βφ ﬃﬃﬃψp
 !
=ð5φ3 ﬃﬃﬃψp Þ ðA11Þ
where ψ ¼ 194β4−364β3φþ 169β2φ2 þ 504β2φ−288βφ2 þ 324φ2. The numerical simulations presented in Appendix B1 and
graphically illustrated in Fig. 1 show that there is a negative relationship between ~α and φ (i.e. ∂ ~α=∂φo0).
A4. The relationship between ~φ and β
Taking the first order derivative of ~φ with respect to β provides:
∂ ~φ
∂β
¼
33β−48þ 13
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
11β2−32β þ 36
q
5
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
11β2−32β þ 36
q
0
B@
1
CA ðA12Þ
It is easy to prove (i.e. using excel solver) that Eq. (A12) is minimized for β¼ 0. Therefore, for β40, there is a positive
relationship between ~φ and β. In addition, taking the second order derivative of ~φ with respect to β provides:
∂2 ~φ
∂β2
¼ 168
ð11β2−32β þ 36Þ3=2
ðA13Þ
It is obvious that the second order derivative of ~φ with respect to β is positive since 11β2−32β þ 3640 due to Eq. (A12).
Therefore, the critical value ~φ, which makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments when ~α ¼ 1,
increases with an increasing rate as β increases as well.
Appendix B
This section uses numerical simulations in order to assess the impact of regulatory uncertainty on the incumbent’s
incentives to undertake the socially optimal investment level. In particular, the positive value of α, denoted by ~α, that
induces the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal investments (i.e. results in Z ¼ 0) is derived for many combinations
of β and φ under the assumptions that: (i) φo16β= ~α, which implies that the investment cost parameter is not extremely
high in relation to the impact of investments on demand; and (ii) φ4φLð ~αÞ, which ensures that Inð ~αÞ40 and Innð ~αÞ40.
In addition, the analysis is limited to the cases in which βo2 in order to ensure that the entrant is always active in the
retail market. In particular, substituting In into Eq. (13) gives qFC2 ¼ φð1−cÞð18−4β−5αβÞ=ð3XÞ. This implies that when the
regulator compensates the incumbent for the investment risks, the entrant is active in the market when ð18−4β−5αβÞ40.
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qFC2 40 for α∈½0;1. The condition which ensures that qFC2 40 when α¼ 1 is βo2. Therefore, although a necessary and
sufficient condition to ensure that qFC2 40 is ð18−4β−5αβÞ40, the condition βo2 can be used for simplicity without
affecting the final results.
Tables B1–B3 provide the positive and the negative values of α, which are denoted respectively by ~α and ~α2, and lead the
incumbent to undertake the socially optimal investments. The derive results corresponds to the cases in which the
investment cost parameter takes positive integral values between 1 and 10, whereas the impact of investment on demand is
β¼ 0:5, β¼ 1 or β¼ 1:5. It is found that regardless of the particular value of β, ~α is always positive and ~α2 is always negative.
In addition, ~α is positively correlated with β and negatively correlated with φ. These results numerically verify the respective
results of Appendix A3. Moreover, an increase in φ leads ~α to decrease and ~α2 to increase. Simulations show that when φ
tends to infinity, then ~α ¼ ~α2 ¼ 0. This implies that there is always one positive and one negative value of ~α. Thus, the whole
analysis is based on the positive value of α, denoted by ~α, which induces the incumbent to undertake the socially optimal
investments. Tables B1–B3 also show the value of φ, denoted by φLð ~αÞ, which ensure that when α¼ ~α, the privately and the
socially optimal investment levels are both positive. The derived levels of investments and social welfare are also provided
for φ4φLð ~αÞ.
It should be noted that for ~α∈½0;1 the optimal investment level is lower than 1. This result leads to access prices which
are higher than the total investment costs, and hence, the condition that ko1 is violated. However, this result is due to theTable B2
(β¼ 1, c¼ 0:5).
φ ~α ~α2o0 φL Inð ~αÞ ¼ Innð ~αÞ SWnð ~αÞ ¼ SWnnð ~αÞ
1 1.704 −16.904 0.726 1.142 0.338
2 1.200 −6.000 0.767 0.250 0.158
3 0.916 −3.494 0.792 0.133 0.137
4 0.738 −2.428 0.809 0.096 0.129
5 0.618 −1.860 0.821 0.072 0.124
6 0.530 −1.508 0.830 0.059 0.122
7 0.465 −1.265 0.837 0.050 0.120
8 0.417 −1.088 0.842 0.043 0.119
9 0.372 −0.955 0.846 0.038 0.118
10 0.339 −0.851 0.850 0.034 0.117
Table B3
(β¼ 1:5, c¼ 0:5).
φ ~α ~α2o0 φL Inð ~αÞ ¼ Innð ~αÞ SWnð ~αÞ ¼ SWnnð ~αÞ
1 1.682 −25.622 1.482 – –
2 1.500 −7.200 1.523 0.875 0.366
3 1.298 −3.698 1.571 0.283 0.190
4 1.125 −2.400 1.616 0.167 0.156
5 0.985 −1.753 1.654 0.118 0.142
6 0.874 −1.374 1.686 0.091 0.135
7 0.783 −1.126 1.713 0.074 0.130
8 0.709 −0.952 1.736 0.062 0.127
9 0.647 −0.825 1.755 0.054 0.125
10 0.595 −0.727 1.772 0.047 0.123
Table B1
(β¼ 0:5, c¼ 0:5).
φ ~α ~α2o0 φLð ~αÞ Inð ~αÞ ¼ Innð ~αÞ SWnð ~αÞ ¼ SWnnð ~αÞ
1 1.099 −13.099 0.208 0.220 0.132
2 0.609 −5.909 0.214 0.098 0.120
3 0.421 −3.799 0.217 0.063 0.117
4 0.322 −2.797 0.218 0.047 0.115
5 0.260 −2.212 0.219 0.037 0.115
6 0.219 −1.830 0.219 0.031 0.114
7 0.188 −1.560 0.220 0.026 0.114
8 0.166 −1.359 0.220 0.023 0.113
9 0.148 −1.209 0.220 0.020 0.113
10 0.133 −1.081 0.220 0.028 0.113
Table B4
(β¼ 2, c¼ 0:5).
φ ~α ~α2o0 φL Inð ~αÞ ¼ Innð ~αÞ SWnð ~αÞ ¼ SWnnð ~αÞ
9 0.926 −0.768 2.783 0.070 0.134
10 0.861 −0.669 2.824 0.060 0.131
Table B5
(c¼ 0:5).
β 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
~φ 1.124 2.648 4.885 8 11.770 15.894
~φ2 −10.324 −6.648 −3.685 −1.6 −0.170 0.906
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p¼ 100þ βI−ðq1 þ q2Þ, which implies that this demand curve intersects the price axis at a significantly higher point than
p¼ 1þ βI−ðq1 þ q2Þ, results in ko1 without affecting the derived outcomes concerning the particular values of ~α.
Table B4 presents the corresponding results when β¼ 2. In this case the value of α should be lower that 1 in order to
ensure that qFC2 40. It is found that ~αo1 for φ48. In addition, when β¼ 2:5, ~α≤1 for φ≥21:25. This implies that as β
increases, the level of the investment cost parameter which ensures that qFC2 40 increases with an increasing rate.
Lastly, Table B5 shows the values of ~φ that makes the privately and the socially optimal investment levels coincide when
~α ¼ 1.
It is obvious that as long as β≤2:5, the highest value of φ that makes the privately and the socially optimal investment
levels coincide when ~α ¼ 1 is denoted by ~φ since ~φ40 and ~φ2o0. Therefore, if φo ~φ (respectively, φ4 ~φ), the value of α that
makes the incumbent undertake the socially optimal investments is higher (respectively, lower) than 1. However, note that
when β¼ 2, the value of ~φ is equal to the respective value of φ that makes qFC2 ¼ 0. Therefore, φ4 ~φ, and hence, ~αo1. In
addition, when β≥3, ~φ and ~φ2 are both positive. However, note that in such cases the value of φ should be extremely high in
order to ensure that qFC2 40. For example, when β¼ 3, the investment cost parameter which ensure that qFC2 40 is φ448.
Therefore, φ should be higher than the highest value of φ that makes the privately and the socially optimal investment levels
coincide when ~α ¼ 1. As a result, φ4 ~φ, which implies that ~αo1. From the above analysis, it is proven that ~φ2 does not affect
the final outcomes, and hence, the whole analysis should focus on ~φ.
Furthermore, Table B5 numerically verifies the results of Appendix A4 concerning the relationship between β and ~φ. In
particular, the critical value ~φ increases with an increasing rate as β increases as well. In addition, Table B5 is in line with
Fig. 1 since it reveals the values of φ that make ~α ¼ 1 for different values of β.
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